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 THE EVOLUTION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: BALANCING NATIONAL 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the history of electronic surveillance for national security 
purposes within the United States and relates the statutory and constitutional law to the 
current, post September 11th practices. An extensive examination of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court and the recently leaked, classified Terrorist Surveillance 
Program shows that the FISA Court, within its narrow jurisdiction, adequately accounts 
for constitutional standards, yet the TSP—including recent reforms—is in clear violation 
of constitutional and statutory law.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout the history of the United States there exists a constant struggle 
between individual liberties and national security. Attacks from abroad often increase the 
need to strengthen national security, yet this increase leaves open the potential for 
government to erode certain freedoms. This includes the Fourth Amendment, which 
proclaims, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.”1 This particular 
protection continues to be the forefront in the struggle between national security and 
individual freedom. The Fourth Amendment symbolizes “the uniqueness of American 
freedom and the centrality of the concept of the rule of law and the sovereignty of the 
people.”2 Thus the Fourth Amendment is vital to the American system of democracy and 
it is necessary to keep the government from intruding, without cause, on the privacy of its 
citizens.  
Yet intrusion is not always the simple act of government officials entering into 
private property. In recent history the protections found in the Forth Amendment have 
also adapted with changes in technology. Federal law enforcement officers have been 
able to use electronic surveillance as a tool to investigate citizens since the advent of 
electronic communication, and the legal community has adjusted its interpretation of the 
                                                 
1 U.S. Constitution. Amend. IX.  
 
2 Samuel Dash. The Intruders: Unreasonable Searches and Seizures from King John to John 
Ashcroft. (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, 2004), 6.  
 
2 
Fourth Amendment with the changing times. When a national crisis arises however, the 
desire for stronger national security often reopens the debate to what forms of electronic 
surveillance are acceptable.  
The events following September 11th were no exception. In fact, recent events 
show that significant constitutional issues have arisen within the jurisprudence of 
electronic surveillance policy. On January 18, 2007, the Department of Justice announced 
that the National Security Agency’s controversial, warrantless electronic surveillance 
program, often referred to as the Terrorist Surveillance Program, would be brought under 
the jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.3 Some journalists asserted 
that this new announcement was an “an abrupt reversal by the administration” in their 
policies of electronic surveillance on domestic soil.4 Yet after careful examination of the 
change in policy, it is clear that many questions still remain as to the constitutionality of 
the TSP. This paper will argue that the administration’s policy does not end the statutory 
and constitutional violations of the TSP. This argument will be conducted in four steps: 
first, an extensive examination of the jurisprudence of electronic surveillance will be 
examined to lay foundation for the debate; second, it will be argued that an appropriate, 
constitutional balance was achieved with the passage of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act and the subsequent establishment of the FISA Court; next, the 
constitutionality of the Terrorist Surveillance Program will be addressed; and finally, 
various solutions to bring electronic surveillance policy back into the realm of 
constitutionality will be suggested. 
                                                 
3 Dan Eggen. 2007. “Court Will Oversee Wiretapping Program: Change Does Not Settle Qualms 
about Privacy.” The Washington Post, January 18. A01. 
 
4 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER ONE: DEFINING A NEW KIND OF SEARCH 
 
Before examining the present day Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the 
NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program an extensive examination into the history of 
electronic surveillance jurisprudence is necessary to establish how these two entities 
relate to the Fourth Amendment. Practically parallel to the advent of a system of 
electronic communication, electronic surveillance has been a tool of the executive since 
the late 19th century. This tool was first used in a national security setting in instances 
where the Union Army intercepted Confederate telegraphs.5 As communication 
technology evolved, so did the ability to intercept communication, yet, by the early 
1900s, there was no legal standard established on the subject of electronic surveillance. 
The Justice Department reports that the first time any Attorney General considered 
wiretapping for either law enforcement or intelligence purposes was in 1924. Attorney 
General Harlan Fiske Stone prohibited the use of wiretapping on ethical bounds and law 
enforcement officers in the Bureau of Investigation (later the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation) were restricted from using wiretaps for any purpose.6  
This decision, however, was not a legal one and remained an internal Justice 
Department guideline. Thus it did not prevent other Cabinet departments from engaging 
                                                 
5 Berger v. New York. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).  
 
6 “Church Committee Report.” U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence 
Activities and the Rights of Americans. 94th Congress. 1st Session. April 23, 1976. 
 
4 
in wiretapping. This included the Department of Treasury, which at that time was 
actively investigating violators of the National Prohibition Act. The Bureau of 
Prohibitions—then a part of Treasury—was the lead entity in arresting bootleggers and 
did not shy away from the use of electronic surveillance, whether ethical or not. 7 One 
bootlegger who was subject to such surveillance was a man by the name of Roy 
Olmstead.  
In Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court issued its first ruling on how 
electronic surveillance relates to the rights established by the Fourth Amendment. The 
case began with the arrest of Roy Olmstead and eleven of his conspirators. Olmstead had 
managed a bootlegging operation within the state of Washington and, in the course of 
their investigation, law enforcement officers—without entering the building—wiretapped 
Olmstead’s office. Over the course of many months the officers obtained the information 
needed to arrest Olmstead and this information was used as evidence to convict him. 
Olmstead appealed his conviction, asserting that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights 
had been violated.8  
The Court issued its ruling on June 4, 1928. In it Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft argues that Olmstead’s rights were not violated due to the conduct of his 
conversation and the nature of the process of electronic surveillance. Justice Taft first 
asserts that “there is no room in the present case for applying the Fifth Amendment, 
unless the Fourth Amendment was first violated,” because Olmstead was not compelled 
to communicate with his telephone by law enforcement officers. Therefore, Justice Taft 
                                                 
7 “Church Committee Report.” 
 
8 Olmstead v. United States. 279 U.S. 849 (1929). 
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continues, “consideration must be confined to the Fourth Amendment.”9 In considering 
the Fourth Amendment, the Court found that wiretapping did not constitute a search as 
defined by the Amendment. The Court frames its justification with an examination of 
cases where searches were physically conducted and then compares them with the 
Olmstead case where there is “testimony only of voluntary conversations secretly 
overheard.”10 The Court did recognize that, in order to consider wiretapping a search, the 
legal definition of the phrase “search and seizure” would have to evolve with the 
advances of modern technology. But Chief Justice Taft—with four other justices 
concurring—was not ready to make this leap. Since there was no physical invasion of 
“tangible material effects,”11 the Court did not consider wiretapping to be a Fourth 
Amendment search.  
With four justices dissenting, this opinion, while a majority, was not strongly 
supported. This not only indicates that Olmstead was a narrow ruling, but that, with four 
justices behind it, the dissenting opinions could eventually evolve into a new type of 
Fourth Amendment search.  Justice Louis D. Brandeis, as one of these justices, “entered a 
powerful dissent.”12 He argues that the Fourth Amendment has never had “unduly literal 
construction”13 placed upon it. Furthermore, he argues—with the other dissenting justices 
echoing his call—that the Constitution must evolve with a changing society and that 
                                                 
9 Ibid.  
 
10 Ibid.  
 
11 Ibid. 
 
12 Erin L Brown. “ECHELON: The National Security Agency's Compliance with Applicable 
Legal Guidelines in Light of the Need for Tighter National Security.” CommLaw Conspectus. 2003. 1 
CommLaw Conspectus 185. 
 
13 Olmstead v. United States. Brandeis dissent. 
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evolution must include changes in technology. 14 If technology allows for government to 
circumvent the literal interpretation of the Constitution through electronic surveillance, 
then, Justice Brandeis argues, interpretation of the Constitution should uphold the context 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Over time, society would continue to evolve, and as it did, 
the legal arena of electronic surveillance would eventually reform to Justice Brandeis’s 
standards. 
In the aftermath of Olmstead, the use of information obtained by electronic 
surveillance in court without a warrant was constitutionally permissive. Even so, state 
and federal investigations only made sporadic use of this power. For example, Congress 
passed the Federal Communications Act in 1934 which prohibited wiretapping and, 
although it was interpreted to allow for some use by federal agents, the Justice 
Department still considered the practice unethical.15 With the advent of World War II, 
however, the use of electronic surveillance within the United States for national security 
purposes grew and “did not wane with the end of the war.”16
By the 1950s the Federal Bureau of Investigation had grown considerably due to 
its importance in national security intelligence during World War II. The Bureau’s 
development as an entity eventually led to its evolution into an “autonomous agency, 
independent of both the president and attorney general.”17 It was in this era when the 
FBI’s wiretapping practices expanded as the Justice Department now concluded that the 
                                                 
14 Brown, “ECHELON.” 
 
15 “Church Committee Report.” 
 
16 Robert N Davis. “Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties.” Brooklyn Journal 
of International Law. 2003. 29 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 175. 
 
17 Athan Theoharis. “FBI Wiretapping: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Autonomy.” Political 
Science Quarterly. Vol. 107. No 1. (Spring 1992). Pg 104.  
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Federal Communications Act “did not apply to federal agents.”18 The use of wiretaps 
increased dramatically and the FBI began to use this surveillance for investigatory, 
national security and even political purposes.19   
With electronic surveillance becoming a greater tool in law enforcement, the 
constitutionality of the practice of wiretapping once again came before the Supreme 
Court. In 1961 the Supreme Court heard the case Silverman v. United States and ruled 
that when federal agents physically intrude on a person’s home to record conversations, 
they violate the Fourth Amendment.20 Six years later the case Berger v. New York (1967) 
reached the Court and the justices’ interpretation of electronic surveillance took a large 
step towards Justice Brandeis’s view of evolving with society. The Court examined a 
bribery case where state law enforcement officers obtained judicial approval for a 
specific form of electronic surveillance known as “bugging.” This instance did not 
involve the wiretapping of a phone line but instead the eavesdropping of a conversation 
through electronic means. The Court ruled that this instance—while it did have judicial 
approval—still failed to meet the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard.21 Unlike 
any case before it, in Berger the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment must apply to 
instances of electronic surveillance because the recorded conversations used in the 
conviction was a search and seizure as defined by the Fourth Amendment.  
Six months later, the final case that brought an end to the Olmstead precedent 
finally applied this justification to the use of wiretapping within law enforcement 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
 
19 Ibid 105. 
 
20 Silverman v. United States. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
 
21Berger v. New York. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).  
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investigations. In Katz v. United States (1967), the Supreme Court examined a case where 
the defendant’s phone conversation in a public telephone booth was wiretapped and the 
recording was used to convict him at trial. While the defendant and the government 
founded their arguments on whether public property was constitutionally protected, the 
Court took on the issue from a different angle. The Court asserts that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places” and thus the issue of constitutionality rests on 
the concept of privacy and not on the physical location of the defendant. The Court 
begins its ruling by clarifying that the Fourth Amendment “cannot be translated into a 
general constitutional ‘right to privacy’” but instead protects individuals’ privacy against 
certain types of governmental intrusion.22 When examining the Katz case, the Court held 
that what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”23 Any conversation that an individual seeks to keep 
private is constitutionally protected and, by recording these conversations, the 
government performs a search and seizure as defined by the Fourth Amendment.  
The question of when one’s communication is deemed private and thus falls under 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment is outlined in Justice Harlan’s concurring 
opinion. This concurrence “provided an important test for a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in regard to Fourth Amendment protections” which has “remained in effect to 
this day.”24 Justice Harlan’s test broke the issue of privacy into two parts: first, the 
individual must have demonstrated an actual expectation of privacy; second, this 
                                                 
22 Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967).  
 
23 Ibid. 
 
24 Brown, “ECHELON.” 
 
9 
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.25 This 
reasonableness standard in Justice Harlan’s test opens the door to the reality that “the 
legitimate needs of law enforcement may demand specific exceptions” to normal Fourth 
Amendment warrants.26
This need for exceptions to the general warrant rule was recognized in Katz’s 
majority opinion, with particular emphasis on national security. Footnote 23 of the 
Court’s ruling specifically states, “Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a 
magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national 
security is a question not presented by this case.”27 Clearly, the Court left open the 
question of whether or not electronic surveillance of national security issues required 
judicial approval. There was even disagreement among the members as to how national 
security issues should be handled. In his concurring opinion, Justice White elaborates on 
the need for a national security exception. He contends that the President and the 
Attorney General should have sole discretion when deciding what constitutes a national 
security matter. Justice Douglas attacks this view, however, stating that Justice White’s 
interpretation of footnote 23 would give an “unwarranted green light for the Executive 
Branch” to conduct any electronic surveillance under the guise of national security.28
Regardless of the ambiguity found in Justices White and Douglas’ dicta on the 
national security exception, the Katz opinion became the bedrock of electronic 
surveillance jurisprudence. Congress quickly enacted legislation to establish a process for 
                                                 
25 Katz v. United States. Justice Harlan’s concurrence. 
 
26 Ibid. 
 
27 Katz v. United States.  
 
28 Katz v. United States. Justice Douglas’s concurrence.  
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law enforcement to obtain warrants for electronic surveillance that abided by the 
constitutional requirements prevalent in the Fourth Amendment. The Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 defined the bureaucratic procedures to protect the 
constitutional rights guaranteed to citizens in Katz. The executive’s authority to conduct 
electronic surveillance in matters of national security, however, continued unchecked as 
the act “expressly indicated that it was not intended to interfere with the executive 
authority of the President” when related to national security.29 Therefore, when it came to 
instances of national security, the executive remained immune from the procedural 
restrictions of judicial scrutiny.  
                                                 
29 Davis. “Striking the Balance.” 
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CHAPTER TWO: EXPLOITING NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
This avenue for wiretapping without judicial and legislative oversight would not 
remain open for long, however, as certain events caused both the Supreme Court and 
Congress to begin to examine this issue more stringently. The first instance of applying 
Forth Amendment standards to wiretapping for national security reasons came in the case 
United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. It 
became known among legal scholars as the Keith case because the government filed a 
writ of mandamus challenging the decision by then District Judge Damon J. Keith.30 
Judge Keith had ordered the government to disclose the transcripts of warrantless 
electronic surveillance information related to national security. The case involved three 
individuals indicted for conspiracy to destroy Government property. One of the 
defendants was also charged with the dynamite bombing of a Central Intelligence Agency 
office building. This defendant moved to have the government disclose the recorded 
conversations and also moved to hold hearings to determine whether these recordings 
“tainted” the evidence found in the indictment.31 This was the first time that the national 
security exception to the Fourth Amendment procedural protections had reached the 
Supreme Court. In essence, the Court was asked to take up the debate that Justices White 
and Douglas had engaged in with their concurrences in Katz.  
                                                 
30 John Cary Sims. “What NSA Is Doing ... and Why It's Illegal.” Hastings Constitutional Law 
Quarterly. Winter / Spring, 2006. 33 Hastings Const. L.Q. 105.  
 
31 United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan et al. 407 U.S. 
297 (1972). 
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The Court, in its opinion, held that footnote 23 of Katz and the national security 
exceptions in Title III were not grounds for complete disregard for Fourth Amendment 
protections. The Court found that “official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal 
investigation or ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally 
protected privacy of speech.”32 Such a risk, the Court argues, does “not justify departure 
in this case from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval prior 
to initiation of a search or surveillance.”33 Clearly, with the ruling in the Keith case, the 
national security exception in electronic surveillance practices shrunk significantly. 
This exception, however, was not completely eliminated. The Court had ruled 
within the context of the Keith case, only in reference to situations where domestic 
organizations threaten national security. The Court was quick to point out the limits this 
ruling had when applied to electronic surveillance levied against foreign threats. The 
ruling makes sure to note that the Court is not addressing the issue “with respect to 
activities of foreign powers or their agents.”34 The Court further argues “that warrantless 
surveillance, though impermissible in domestic security cases, may be constitutional 
where foreign powers are involved.”35 Once again the Court extended the application of 
Fourth Amendment protections in the realm of electronic surveillance law, yet left open a 
door for the executive to continue some form of surveillance free from judicial scrutiny. 
In fact, for many years after the Keith case, the attorney general was allowed to 
“authorize surveillance of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers without any court 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
 
33 Ibid. 
 
34 Ibid. 
 
35 Ibid. 
 
13 
review.”36 Congress, however, eventually discovered this exception also led to many 
forms of executive abuse. This led to a political atmosphere that was finally ready for 
establishing Article III checks on all forms of electronic surveillance.   
In response to this executive branch abuse Congress, in 1976, began to investigate 
the possibility of executive misuse of electronic surveillance by creating the Senate Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 
referred to as the Church Committee after Senator Frank Church. On April 23, 1976, the 
Church Committee issued a report which, in part, outlined various instances of executive 
misconduct within the realm of electronic surveillance practices. The committee noted 
that after the ruling in the Keith case restricting most forms of warrantless electronic 
surveillance, “all existing warrantless electronic surveillances were directed against 
foreigners.”37 This demonstrates that the executive branch had now ceased all warrantless 
surveillance previously allowed before the ruling in Keith. This did not, however, prove 
that there was no abuse of electronic surveillance policy. The committee also noted that 
the proportion of foreign targets had grown significantly after the Keith ruling,38 
indicating that the executive was utilizing the foreign powers exception in order to 
circumvent judicial scrutiny.  
This abuse was not limited to one party or one president. The committee offered 
examples of multiple administrations improperly applying the foreign powers exception. 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy authorized the surveillance of Congressmen in their 
                                                 
36 The 9/11 Commission Report. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States. July 22, 2004. Public Law 107-306. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm. Pg 78. 
 
37 “Church Committee Report.”  
 
38 Ibid.  
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negotiations with foreign officials on sugar quota proposals, an action clearly not related 
to the protection of national security. Kennedy also authorized wiretaps on the residence 
and office of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. merely on the bases that two of his associates 
may have been associated with the Communist Party.39 The Kennedy Administration was 
not the only one to engage in questionable electronic surveillance policy. President 
Lyndon Johnson personally told the FBI to inform him on foreign officials’ contact with 
Congressmen. This directly resulted in the electronic surveillance “of each Senator, 
Representative, or staff member who communicated with selected foreign 
establishments.”40 One documented incident also showed that, at the request of President 
Johnson, the FBI “instituted an electronic surveillance of a foreign target for the purpose 
of intercepting telephone conversations of a particular American citizen.”41
These practices continued under President Richard Nixon; the administration 
informed the FBI that they “wanted any information … relating to contacts between 
[certain foreign officials] and Members of Congress and its staff.”42 Furthermore, the 
Nixon administration used these exceptions to justify “his departures from electronic 
surveillance law. In the wake of these discoveries, Congress determined that additional 
statutory protections were needed to close the loopholes in Title III.”43  
                                                 
39 Ibid.  
 
40 Ibid.  
 
41 Ibid.  
 
42 Ibid.   
 
43 Grayson A. Hoffman. “Litigating Terrorism: The New FISA Regime, the Wall, and the Fourth 
Amendment.” American Criminal Law Review. Fall, 2003. 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1655. 
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Clearly, these violations show that misuse of executive electronic surveillance 
was widespread throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This misconduct continued in every 
administration, regardless of party affiliation. Not only was the Fourth Amendment 
privacy of multiple U.S. persons violated by the executive’s actions, but “moreover, the 
use of warrantless electronic surveillance against… attorneys, Congressmen and 
Congressional staff members, and journalists, has revealed an insensitivity to the values 
inherent in the Sixth Amendment and the doctrines of ‘separation of powers’ and 
‘freedom of the press’.”44 The fact that these actions were not well-intended attempts at 
protecting national security but instead complex conspiracies to spy on political 
opponents shows that any form of electronic surveillance without judicial authorization 
undoubtedly has direct harm on the American system of democracy. 
                                                 
44 “Church Committee Report.” 
 
16 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: CHECKING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
 
Given the prevalent abuse of electronic surveillance by the executive branch, the 
Church Committee supported a piece of legislation which had already been introduced 
into Congress.45 This law would designate federal judges to find probable cause that a 
suspect is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power before electronic surveillance 
could be initiated. The Church Committee considered this solution to be a “significant 
step towards effective regulation of FBI electronic surveillance.”46
Based upon this Church Committee recommendation, Congress blocked the final 
avenue for warrantless electronic surveillance. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
was passed in 1978. “This law regulated intelligence collection directed at foreign powers 
and agents of foreign powers in the United States” and brought the only remaining 
avenue for warrantless electronic surveillance under Article III jurisdiction.47  Some legal 
scholars contend that “FISA represents an effort by the political branches to promote 
judicial involvement in fighting threats to the national security.”48 While it is true that 
FISA includes the judiciary in the process of protecting national security, it is important 
to recognize that the true foundation of FISA “was a reaction to executive branch abuses 
                                                 
45 “Church Committee Report.” 
 
46 Ibid.   
 
47 The 9/11 Commission Report. Pg 78. 
 
48 John C. Yoo. “Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism.” The George Washington Law 
Review. December, 2003. 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427. 
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of civil liberties.”49 Congress recognized that a response to the multiple Fourth 
Amendment violations found by the Church Committee was needed; this new 
legislation—while including the judiciary into the realm of national security—was 
established solely to provide an Article III check on the executive’s wiretapping 
authority. 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act took specific steps to provide a check 
on the executive’s electronic surveillance in matters of foreign affairs and eliminated the 
practice of electronic surveillance without judicial approval. First the Act established a 
judicial entity to oversee all electronic surveillance not covered under Title III 
protections. Thus the area of electronic surveillance not covered by the Keith case—
foreign powers or agents of foreign powers—were brought under the jurisdiction of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. This Court consists of judges from various 
federal district courts publicly appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to 
serve nonrenewable seven year terms.50  
In order to engage in electronic surveillance, the government must receive 
approval from this Court by meeting specific standards laid out in the Act. The 
government must demonstrate “probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic 
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”51 The statute further 
defines the terms “foreign power” and “agent of a foreign power,” relating them to 
espionage and international terrorism. FISA also establishes notice and suppression 
                                                 
49 Davis. “Striking the Balance.” 
 
50 Rebecca A. Copeland. “War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the Lines 
of Intelligence Gathering in Post-September 11 America.” Texas Tech Law Review. 35 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 
1. (2004).  
 
51 50 U.S.C. 1805 (18) (I). 
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requirements different than traditional Title III requirements and dictated that the foreign 
intelligence must be the primary purpose of the surveillance.52  
With the passage of FISA, Congress restricted the final avenue open to the 
executive for obtaining domestic electronic surveillance without a court order. This new 
system for electronic surveillance of foreign powers then began to evolve within the 
bureaucratic structure. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Department of Justice created 
“procedures limiting contact between foreign intelligence agents in the FBI and federal 
prosecutors. Those procedures … produced what the public came to call ‘the wall.’”53 
This system was created to comply with the “primary purpose” standard set out in FISA. 
The Department of Justice concluded that if foreign intelligence agents who used FISA 
proceeding in gathering intelligence were not able to collaborate with criminal 
prosecutors then those agents would always meet the primary purpose standard. Yet, as it 
was only Justice Department policy and not a statutory mandate, this “wall” separating 
shared intelligence between foreign intelligence and law enforcement agents was a 
bureaucratic construction and, while recognized as acceptable procedure by some lower 
courts, was never constitutionally mandated by Congress or the judiciary. 
This “wall” first formed by the executive bureaucracy stemmed from a series of 
misinterpretations of the FISA statute and subsequent policies. These misinterpretations 
lead to serious problems of intelligence gathering within the intelligence community.  
Congress had created the “primary purpose” standard in order to prevent authorities from 
                                                 
52 Hoffman, “Litigating Terrorism.” 
 
53 Richard Henry Seamon and William Dylan Gardner. “The Patriot Act and the Wall Between 
Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement.” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. 28 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol'y 319. (Spring, 2005).  
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using FISA to “circumvent traditional criminal warrant requirements.”54 Yet the 
Department of Justice took a stringent interpretation of FISA; federal prosecutors were 
not allowed to control or direct the collection of FISA investigations and the FBI—not 
federal prosecutors—had sole discretion in what information the Justice Department 
could view. In 1995, further policies established by then Attorney General Janet Reno 
again “were almost immediately misunderstood and misapplied.”55 First, although the 
new polices did not require it, the DOJ’s Office of Intelligence Policy Review became the 
sole gatekeeper for passing information through Justice Department channels. OIPR and 
FBI leadership pressured the agents into building further barriers between agents working 
on intelligence gathering and agents working on criminal investigations. These 
restrictions lead to the practice of restricting information from criminal investigators even 
when no FISA procedures had been used.56   
 This divide in the sharing of information between intelligence agents and law 
enforcement officials continued to be the norm until the entire system of foreign 
intelligence gathering was reviewed in the wake of the tragic events of September 11th. In 
response to the “pervasive problems”57 evident in the intelligence community that led up 
to the attacks in New York City and Washington D.C., Congress passed the controversial 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. The many changes that the PATRIOT Act incorporated 
included the breaking down of the bureaucratic wall that separated the sharing of 
intelligence. In relation to FISA, the PATRIOT Act attempted to break down this wall by 
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amending FISA’s “primary purpose” standard to a “significant purpose” standard. This 
change was the result of a compromise between those at Justice who wanted the “primary 
purpose” standard revoked and those who supported the original form of the FISA 
procedure.58 This compromise allowed for shared information between intelligence 
officers and law enforcement agents within their respective investigations and also 
allowed for the use of FISA surveillance in criminal proceedings.  
Reconsideration of the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act was challenged 
within the federal courts, although subsequent rulings supported to its constitutionality. 
The first notable case took place in 1984, before the amendments of the PATRIOT Act. 
In United States v. Duggan, the defendant—a member of the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army—was convicted on charges of transporting explosives via interstate commerce that 
would be used to kill, injure or intimidate individuals. A FISA Court order was issued to 
allow electronic surveillance of the individual and his accomplices. The defendant 
challenged his conviction, arguing first that FISA’s definition of foreign power is too 
broad and thus deprives him due process of the law, and that it violates the probable 
cause standard within the Fourth Amendment.59 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit ruled that the definition was not too broad and that the probable cause 
standard in FISA is constitutional because, as the surveillance falls under the umbrella of 
national security, an adequate balance between a legitimate need of the government and 
the protected rights of citizens was struck within FISA’s language.60  
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The second case to be examined occurred after the amendments of the PATRIOT 
Act and dealt with the Act’s changes to the original FISA “primary purpose” standard. 
This case took place within FISA’s judicial structure as it was the first published opinion 
of the FISA Court of Review. This court was established in the original statute as the 
government’s only means of appeal when a FISA Court order request is denied. In this 
case, the original FISA Trial Court judge denied a request by the government and stated 
that the “primary purpose” test still had to be met within the FISA statute. The FISA 
Court of Review, in its first ever issued opinion, In re Sealed, ruled for the government, 
stating that the PATRIOT Act had lowered the test to a “significant purpose” standard. 
The FISA Court of Review also rejected the argument of amici curiae that it was 
constitutionally necessary to keep intelligence investigations separate from law 
enforcement investigations.61 The Court of Review considered the wall constructed 
between federal intelligence agents and law enforcement agents as a bureaucratic 
misinterpretation of FISA. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated 
with the prosecution of foreign intelligence crimes.62  
                                                 
61 In re Sealed. 310 F.3d 717. 
 
62 Davis. “Striking the Balance.” 
22 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: DEFENDING THE FISA COURT 
 
With the passage of FISA and the subsequent appellate court decisions defending 
its constitutionality, Congress and the judiciary had sealed the last remaining avenue for 
the executive to engage in electronic surveillance without a court order. However, with 
the development of current events, debate has arisen as to whether or not electronic 
surveillance laws and practices adequately protect citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. 
Arguments are levied on both sides; some defend recent practices, such as the NSA’s 
controversial Terrorist Surveillance Program, that go outside the bounds of FISA and 
Title III law, while other legal scholars attack the post PATRIOT Act FISA procedures as 
infringing on citizens’ constitutional rights. Yet with a careful examination of the 
jurisprudence surrounding recent electronic surveillance laws, an adequate balance can be 
found. This balance of national security and individual, constitutional rights is achieved 
when the only means of domestic electronic surveillance are Title III warrants and post 
PATRIOT Act FISA Court orders. Any programs, such as the NSA’s Terrorist 
Surveillance Program, which do not conform to the established Title III or FISA 
procedures, unduly infringe on the civil liberties of United States citizens and are 
therefore outside the grounds of the Constitution. 
Before this paper continues in its argument that, currently, the executive branch’s 
Terrorist Surveillance Program is unconstitutional, it must be conceded that the post 
PATRIOT Act FISA Court is not an acceptable institution to some legal scholars with 
regards to the Fourth Amendment. Thus, in order to argue that a constitutional balance of 
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civil liberties and national security can be reached, this paper must accomplish three 
tasks: first it must mount an adequate defense of the FISA Court; then it must show that 
the Terrorist Surveillance Program intruded on Fourth Amendment protections by 
violating important constitutional checks and balances; finally, solutions must be 
examined which would make sure that future abuses of executive power in the realm of 
electronic surveillance is minimized. 
Legal scholars tend to have four main contentions with the constitutionality of the 
FISA Court: first, many assert that the lack of public proceedings and notification 
requirements are contrary to the Constitution; second, many argue that the different 
probable cause standard is unreasonable within the context of the Fourth Amendment; 
third, that the “wall” restricted shared intelligence is necessary to protect civil rights; 
finally, many legal scholars argue that FISA Court orders allow for abuse of executive 
power. This paper will examine all four main arguments and conclude that FISA Court 
orders—while they do use standards different than Title III warrants—are still reasonable 
within the Fourth Amendment.  
Many organizations assert that FISA proceedings are secret and thus contrary to 
the established system of open government. They claim that, in a democracy, judicial 
procedures must remain within the public’s knowledge to insure the government is not 
intruding on constitutional rights.63 While public proceedings are an important part of 
adhering to an open and legitimate form of government, there are many instances where 
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public access is restricted for reasons of national security. Many aspects of society are 
classified or restricted from public access; from certain bureaucratic regulatory hearings 
to internal documents and classified intelligence, there are undoubtedly instances where 
information cannot be publicly available. Yet national security or public interest claims 
cannot counter all assertions of the need for open access to government. In fact, when this 
discussion enters the realm of the Fourth Amendment, legal precedents often requires 
public proceedings and notification requirements. Electronic surveillance is unique in 
regards to other Fourth Amendment searches however, as the target of the surveillance 
cannot be notified of the search until it is completed, or else the purpose of the 
surveillance is mute. Therefore, when it comes to electronic surveillance, the Court has 
consistently held that there is a legitimate government interest in restricting the public’s 
access to certain proceedings and delaying the notification requirements.64 This concept 
of weighing government’s interest against the requirements in the Fourth Amendment 
continues to hold its balance when examining FISA Court orders. The differences 
between Title III electronic surveillance warrants and FISA Court orders are minimal 
when it comes to public proceedings. Both proceedings are in camera and ex parte. Title 
III procedures are sealed while FISA orders are classified. Thus both processes are 
restricted from public access and both essentially have the same effect: because of the 
inherent secrecy involved in electronic surveillance the government has a legitimate 
interest in restricted public access.  
There is one significant aspect of FISA Court orders that is not parallel to the 
Title III procedures when it comes to notification. In the Title III procedure “all targets 
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must receive notice … that they were the target of an electronic investigation. FISA only 
requires notice to the target when the government intends to use the information as 
evidence in trial against them.”65 When analyzing the differences in these procedures, 
two different balancing tests must be applied. First, in Title III warrants, the privacy 
rights of a citizen to know when he or she has been the target of a search are balanced 
against the government’s compelling interest in enforcing the law. Therefore, after the 
search is completed, the government either has the choice to prosecute, and must then 
disclose the evidence collected in the search, or must decide not to pursue charges, in 
which case the government’s compelling interest to keep the citizen ignorant to the 
search is mute. It follows that the only constitutionally acceptable avenue is notification. 
In FISA Court orders, the standard shifts weight. The government—when it is opting not 
to engage in a criminal prosecution—has a compelling interest to keep the search secret. 
There is a fundamentally different purpose for FISA Court orders; whether criminal 
prosecutions are involved or not, FISA orders are enacted to prevent threats posed to 
national security. This fact, when balanced against a citizen’s right to be notified that a 
search has taken place, is compelling enough for the information to remain secret. 
Furthermore, while FISA Court orders do differ in the aspect of notification, this 
standard is only different when the government is not planning to prosecute the subject of 
the FISA surveillance. The government’s interest in protecting national security in 
relation to the notification of electronic surveillance against foreign powers only 
outweighs the rights of the agents of foreign powers when collecting intelligence. When 
the government seeks to use electronic surveillance in the arena of law enforcement and 
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seeks to initiate any criminal prosecution, the rights of the targeted foreign power then 
trump the government’s need for secrecy. The government, if it desires to use FISA Court 
information in a criminal procedure, must allow the defendant, and the defendant’s 
attorneys, access to the information.66 Clearly, when examining FISA procedures through 
this balancing test, FISA Court orders meet the reasonableness clause of the Fourth 
Amendment.  
 Public procedures and notification requirements are not the only contention with 
the FISA Court. Some scholars also argue that the lessened probable cause standard used 
to issue FISA Court orders violates the Fourth Amendment.67 First, however, it is 
important to note that case law is ambiguous as to whether or not FISA Court orders are 
“warrants” as defined by the Fourth Amendment. Although the government argued that 
they were in In re Sealed, the Court of Review stopped short of addressing the question. 
The Court did, however, review the question of the reasonableness of FISA Court orders 
and found them to meet the standards set by the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion is 
not outside precedent as the Supreme Court has upheld many instances of reasonable 
exceptions to the warrants clause.  
 In order to meet the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard both Title III 
warrants and FISA Court orders have different probable cause standards. Title III 
warrants require the government to show probable cause that a crime was committed or is 
about to be committed. This is because the purpose of a Title III warrant is solely based 
on enforcing the law. Thus, a person’s right to remain secure from an unreasonable 
search is weighed against the government’s compelling interest to enforce the law. FISA 
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Court orders, once again, require a different balance. A person’s right to remain secure 
from an unreasonable search is now weighed against the government’s compelling 
interest to protect national security. To examine this balance the purpose of Title III 
warrants verse the purpose of FISA Court orders must again be examined. Title III 
warrants are issued to collect evidence that a crime has been committed in order to 
prosecute that crime. When working against terrorists, however, the government must act 
to prevent terrorist actions. As one legal scholar states, “Title III … was crafted to punish 
and deter normal crimes” whereas “FISA procedures … were specifically created to 
prevents such crimes before they occur.”68 This need to prevent terrorist activities shows 
the government’s compelling interest to have a lessened probable cause standard, as 
demonstrated in the Duggan case. Furthermore, it must be understood that this standard 
only applies to a very narrow portion of the population. The government must 
demonstrate probable cause that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power. Also, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’s definition of an agent of a 
foreign power is “rooted in criminal conduct,”69 such as terrorism or espionage. Thus the 
probable cause standard is similar to the Title III standard because both are based off 
criminal actions. This standard is further narrowed when a citizen is targeted; the 
government cannot base their evidence of probable cause solely on the target’s First 
Amendment actions.70  
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 Some legal scholars accept the fact that notification and probable cause standards 
differ when the government’s interests in the surveillance change yet still assert the 
current application of FISA is unconstitutional. They argue that the USA PATRIOT Act 
altered the “primary purpose” standard set in the original version of FISA and thus 
violated the wall between intelligence sharing and law enforcement.71 These scholars 
contend that that wall is a constitutional necessity rather than a bureaucratic 
construction.72 This contention, however, is contrary to the previous examination of the 
jurisprudence surrounding the PATRIOT Act’s amendments to FISA. In In re Sealed, the 
FISA Court of Review held that the primary purpose standard was not constitutionally 
binding.73 The government’s compelling interest in protecting national security still 
allows for electronic surveillance of foreign powers when the government demonstrates 
that a significant purpose of the surveillance is for foreign intelligence. Furthermore, 
many legal scholars hold that the original interpretation of FISA by the Justice 
Department that a wall should be constructed between intelligence agents and law 
enforcement officers “has never had a statutory foundation and still lacks one.”74 The 
only contradictory precedent to this anaylisis is the pre-FISA case United States v. 
Truong which first coined the “primary purpose” standard. Yet, because this case was “a 
pre-FISA case that never analyzed the Fourth Amendment implications of a significant 
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purpose test,” the Court of Review found it inapplicable.75 “In other words, criminal 
investigation can be used as the primary tool to fight foreign-based threats such as 
terrorism or counterintelligence. Because Truong neglected this glaring reality, the court 
concluded, Troung was neither binding nor persuasive in connection with FISA’s new 
significant purpose test.”76 Clearly, neither the “significant purpose” nor the “primary 
purpose” tests erected a wall separating foreign intelligence gathering and prosecutorial 
surveillance. 
The FISA Court of Review did establish a standard to restrict the government’s 
use of FISA orders that was mandated by the Fourth Amendment. The government must 
“draw a line between ‘foreign intelligence crimes’ and ‘non-foreign intelligence crimes’” 
in order to abide by FISA and the Fourth Amendment.77 While statutory law is 
ambiguous in this regard, it is a necessary component of FISA procedure. Finally, the 
argument that constitutionality rests on whether surveillance is conducted for foreign 
intelligence purposes or law enforcement purposes lacks logical foundation within the 
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens’ right to privacy when the 
government conducts an unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, reasonableness is 
dependent on the search, not on the use of the information obtained in the search. For 
example, if the government were to wiretap an individual without any court approval, and 
it was clearly not within any exceptions to court approval, then the unreasonable search 
of the individual—and thus the violation of the Fourth Amendment—has already taken 
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place, regardless of whether the government intends to use the information in trial. 
Whether or not the information is to be used in a court proceeding is inconsequential; the 
government need only show a significant purpose of foreign intelligence and the probable 
cause to believe the target is a foreign power in order to use FISA authorized electronic 
surveillance.  
Clearly, the standards applied to FISA Court orders are reasonable when viewed 
in their narrow context. The government can only use the lower standards in FISA when 
probable cause that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power exists and 
“generally speaking, FISA does not authorize secret surveillance of average American 
citizens.”78 Courts have held that these terms are not broad, and are in fact clearly defined 
in the FISA statute.79 Some legal scholars do contend, however, that FISA procedures 
still allow for misuse by the executive branch.80 Clearly, this view is unfounded, because 
FISA uses the same check on executive power that is found in Title III warrants. The 
safeguards that protect statutory violations of civil liberties are different in Title III and 
FISA procedures, yet the safeguard that exists to protect against executive misuse of 
electronic surveillance is the same in both procedures: judicial approval. Both FISA 
orders and Title III warrants require the government to obtain approval from an 
independent judicial authority. As with Title III procedures, if an adequate judicial check 
on every one of the executive’s request to initiate electronic surveillance, then instances 
of misuse by the government can be significantly minimized.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: BREAKING WITH FISA LAW 
 
Unfortunately the statutory status quo previously analyzed is not the de facto 
situation that has occurred after September 11th. This paper will continue by analyzing 
the Terrorist Surveillance Program and how it contrasts with decades of electronic 
surveillance jurisprudence. Next it will be argued that if the administration was granted 
blanket authorization to continue the TSP from a FISA Court judge, then the 
administration is still acting outside the scope of the law. Finally, a number of 
recommendations will be presented that—if implemented—will help to return, and to 
keep, the actions of the executive branch back within legal realm of electronic 
surveillance policy.  
First publicly reported in the New York Times, in 2002 the President signed an 
order secretly authorizing the National Security Agency to use electronic surveillance to 
spy on individuals within the United States without first seeking approval from the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.81 This program, though animatedly defended by 
the Bush Administration, is criticized by many legal scholars as violating both statutory 
and constitutional law. The Terrorist Surveillance Program continued despite criticism, 
and not until January of 2007 did the administration announced TSP would now be under 
the authority of the FISA Court. This recent shift in policy does not mean the program is 
now within the boundaries of the law, however, as the “precise outlines of and legal 
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justification for the monitoring remain unclear.”82 While the administration has indicated 
they plan to brief certain Senate Judiciary members on the changes, the administration 
has failed to say whether the Terrorist Surveillance Program has been completely 
eliminated, or whether a single FISA Court judge has given blanket authorization of the 
program. Recent comments by the President seem to infer the latter: “the FISA court said 
I did have the authority … it's important that they verify the legality of this program is it 
means it's going to extend … yesterday was a very important day for the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program. Nothing has changed in the program except for the court has said 
… it is a legitimate way to protect the country.”83 Regardless of the ambiguity, it is clear 
that for over five years the administration circumvented the statutory laws regulating the 
use of electronic surveillance.  
It is clear that the justifications for the administration’s use of the TSP do not hold 
up to thorough examination. Many scholars—as well as current and former government 
officials—conclude “that the program is illegal.”84 Several also argue that the motives 
behind the TSP were to “circumvent FISA’s court-approval process with respect to 
electronic surveillance that would be authorized by FISA and, almost certainly, to engage 
in forms of surveillance that FISA prohibits.”85 It is undoubtedly clear that this program 
is contrary to federal court precedent because it allows for electronic surveillance on 
domestic United States soil without judicial approval or any showing of probable cause. 
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The administration still defends the legality of the program, however, and 
believes the program is allowed under the Authorization for Use of Military Force.86 
Congress passed the AUMF just after the September 11th terrorist attacks, authorizing the 
President “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against “persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 
11, 2003.”87 This Act, the administration argues, allows for the TSP because warrantless 
surveillance is included in “all necessary and appropriate force.” Furthermore, the 
administration argues that they are not acting outside of the scope of FISA. They also 
contend that tacit judicial approval for the TSP is granted through the Supreme Court 
case Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.88  
A significant number of legal scholars, as well as many government officials, 
seriously disagreed with the administrations interpretation of the expansion of executive 
power implied in the AUMF. On January 9, 2006 several of these scholars drafted a letter 
to the Department of Justice outlining their contentions with the program and arguing that 
the TSP was in violation of United States statutory and constitutional law.89 The letter 
outlined the why the administration’s defense of the Terrorist Surveillance Program does 
not hold up to statutory law and legal precedent surrounding the use of electronic 
surveillance. They argue that the implication that the AUMF allows for complete 
warrantless wiretapping on domestic soil “directly contradicts express and specific 
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language in” the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.90 FISA specifically states that 
it—along with Title III wiretaps—are the “exclusive means by which electronic 
surveillance … and the interception of domestic wire, oral and electronic 
communications may be conducted.”91 Clearly, for the administration to believe that the 
ambiguous language in the AUMF overrides the specific procedures laid out in FISA is 
completely unreasonable.  
Even if Congress intended to repeal FISA with the AUMF, the scholars argue, the 
evidence of such intent would, by case law precedent, have to be “overwhelming.”92 
Citing Morton v. Mancari (1974), they argue that, since the two statutes in conflict are 
not “irreconcilable,” the evidence is not considered overwhelming enough for the 
administration to legally infer the intent of Congress.93 Clearly, based on precedent, the 
administration could not legally infer Congress tacitly approved of the implementation of 
the TSP. Furthermore, the legal scholars point out a serious contradiction in the 
administration’s justification for the program. They first cite that the Attorney General 
“has admitted that the administration did not seek to amend FISA to authorize the NSA 
spying program because it was advised that Congress would reject such an 
amendment.”94 Clearly this is a blatant contradiction to their claims of tacit approval of 
Congress; if the legislative branch had intended to approve of the Terrorist Surveillance 
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Program in the AUMF, then the administration would not need to fear a possible 
rejection from Congress. 
Lastly, the legal scholars note that the only case law the administration uses to 
defend the legality of the Terrorist Surveillance Program is the recently decided case 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. Yet this case held that, under the AUMF, the administration is only 
allowed to hold enemy combatants captured on the battlefield, and in fact, it contradicted 
the administration’s assertion that the AUMF allows for domestic use of force. The 
Court’s narrow ruling in this case in no way justified the extension of the executive 
branch’s electronic surveillance powers. It dealt entirely with Congress’s intent as it 
applied to the literal battlefield of a foreign front, “it is another matter entirely to treat 
unchecked warrantless domestic spying as included in that authorization.”95 The Court 
undoubtedly found that Congress had implied the power for the administration to hold 
enemy combatants obtained on a foreign battlefield; yet for the administration to view 
this ruling as an extension of executive electronic surveillance is unfounded.  
While these contentions were raised as soon as the TSP was publicly announced, 
the administration did not change their stringent support of the program until January 
2007. As previously examined, the administration did bring the program under the 
authority of the FISA Court. Yet this move brings new and difficult questions to the 
table. It is unclear as to whether or not the FISA Court is examining every individual 
request for surveillance under the TSP or whether the single FISA judge gave the 
program blanket authorization. If the FISA Court judge did give the program 
authorization in its entirety, then serious constitutional issues remain. First, a FISA Court 
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judge has no statutory jurisdiction to authorize an entire surveillance program; the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act only allows FISA Court judges to rule on 
individual cases concerning individual targets where the government has probable cause 
to believe they are agents of a foreign power. From what is known of the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program, no protections exist to distinguish agents of foreign powers and 
other U.S. persons. Furthermore, there is no real Article III protection for civil liberties 
under this situation. Only individual evaluation of each wiretapping application by an 
Article III judge can protect against Fourth Amendment violations.96 Clearly, “the 
terrorist surveillance program directly conflicts with the judicially sanctioned procedure 
for conducting warrantless electronic surveillance”97 and violates both statutory and 
constitutional precedent.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
When analyzing other areas of government where electronic surveillance is used 
for criminal investigations, it is clear that American society is wary of its extended use. 
State governments have been quick to limit electronic surveillance by law enforcement. 
While local legislatures have no jurisdiction over the use of federal wiretaps, most have 
not significantly altered their own wiretapping laws in the post 9-11 era. While “New 
York lawmakers broadened their wiretap laws to add terrorist activities to the list of 
offenses police can investigate with electronic eavesdropping … only one other state—
Florida—is considering following New York’s lead.”98 Furthermore, many states have 
also extended the guidelines for their applications for electronic surveillance; some going 
as far as limiting how many wiretaps are allowed in a given year, while others have even 
restricted the use of information obtained in wiretaps in criminal court proceedings.99  
More specifically, there are strong indications that the American public is wary of 
the current administration’s decision to use the Terrorist Surveillance Program to 
authorize warrantless wiretapping. A Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll conducted in 
April 2006 found a plurality of those polled considered the TSP an unacceptable way for 
the federal government to investigate terrorists. A plurality of those polled also believed 
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that the U.S. Senate should censure the President because of these actions.100 This shows 
that not only do a significant number of legal scholars believe that the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program is unconstitutional but that the general American public—even in a 
post 9-11 environment—is wary of the administration’s use of warrantless electronic 
surveillance.  
In order for this electronic surveillance system to revert back to the realm of 
constitutionality, certain solutions must be implemented from policy makers in 
Washington. Clearly, “the solution should come from legislation.”101 Many legal scholars 
assert that changes must be made in order to bring the system back under the proper 
jurisdiction of the FISA Court. First, Congress must pass legislation which specifically 
denies a single FISA Court judge from giving the TSP—or any similar program—blanket 
authorization. The jurisdiction of any FISA Court judge should be reemphasized as only 
dealing with individual requests for targets who the government can demonstrate 
probable cause that the person is an agent of a foreign power. With such statutory 
mandates, electronic surveillance policy would then return to the necessary constitutional 
standard. Next, legislation must address the Terrorist Surveillance Program specifically; 
it should either eliminate the program in its entirety or mandate that the process be 
brought under the FISA Court and the procedure meet FISA standards. Next, if Congress 
deems the National Security Agency needs more flexibility in its actions, legislators 
should make sure any reforms are constitutional sound. Many legal scholars assert that 
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changes could be made to expedite the FISA order process.102 This could include 
combining requests into one application yet giving FISA Court judges line item veto 
power within their orders, or Congress could create different probable cause standards 
which would align with legal precedent but would also give the NSA a different approach 
to specific national security issues.103 Lastly, Congress must begin—and continue—
rigorous oversight of the executive’s use of electronic surveillance programs. The desire 
to keep information classified and out of Congress’s view cannot override Congress’s 
important responsibility to act as a check on executive power. Only with these—or 
similar—changes to the structure of electronic surveillance policy can the integrity and 
legality of the system be recognized by the legal community. 
Finally, some legal scholars argue that—regardless of the legality of the 
program—national security cannot be put on hold for the possible infraction of civil 
rights. One legal scholar contends that “for law-abiding citizens, the benefits of a secure 
nation far outweigh the infrequent risks to one’s individual expectation of private 
communications.”104 This scholar, however, fails to see the necessity of the constitutional 
safeguards which define the very structure of American government. The very system of 
this government is founded on the idea that “law abiding” individuals should not fear 
government intrusion, even if such intrusion is “infrequent.” Any need for national 
security cannot overlook the letter of the law. In the case of electronic surveillance, an 
acceptable constitutional balance between civil liberties and national security was 
reached with the passage of FISA. Any extension of executive power that was invented 
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by the notion of tacit Congressional approval clearly violations this important and fragile 
constitutional balance.   
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